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Descartes

on

Love

and/as

Error

Byron Williston

But if this medicine, love, which cures all sorrow
With more, not only be no quintessence,
But mixed of all stuffs, paining soul, or sense,
And of the sun his workingvigour borrow,
Love's not so pure, and abstract,as they use
To say, which have no mistressbut their Muse,
But as all else, being elementedtoo,
Love sometimes would contemplate,sometimes do.'
One of philosophy's most enduring questions is inspired by Plato's
Euthyphro:do we love somethingbecause it is lovable, or is it lovablebecause
we love it?2Perhapsnowhereis thisproblemmoreintractablethanin Descartes's
theoryof love. In his view love is the concreteattempton the partof humansto
develop an ethical reciprocitywhich ideally fulfils the need both to discover
and to create value. The strict disjunctionof the Platonic question is to this
extent somewhatmisleadingbecause Descartesis genuinelychallengedby the
respective demandsof both sides of the question. It would thereforebe a mistake to fasten on one side of this distinctionto the utterexclusion of the other.
But the temptationto do precisely this with Descartes is strong indeed.
This is a temptationwhich extendseven to ethical matters,in which Descartes
seems loatheto subordinatethe searchfor certaintyto merely contingentpractical demands. In addressingthe problem of moral weakness he writes, for

For their helpful comments on an earlierdraftof this paper,I would like to thankRonald
de Sousa, Andre Gombay,and Robert Imlay.
"Love's Growth,"John Donne: The CompleteEnglish Poems, ed. A. J. Smith (London,
1986), 69.
2
Plato, Euthyphro,from Five Dialogues, tr. G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis, 1981), 14.
Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), 1, addresses this
problem as the "antinomyof objectivity,"which derives from the "plausibilityof both alternative answers"to the question of the Euthyphro.
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example, that"the strengthof the soul is inadequatewithoutknowledge of the
truth."3
The call to live in the light of certaintruths-moral or otherwise-is so
persistenta theme for him that the burdenof proof would seem to be on those
who want to claim that this is neverthelessnot so in certainareas.The bulk of
this paperis thus devotedto showingthat,despite some appearances,Descartes
is not concernedovermuchwith the problemof attainingcertaintyand avoiding error in love judgments. He wants us to see love as a complex psychophysical phenomenon which cannot be reduced to the desire to obtain true
judgments aboutthe world.
To focus the discussion I examine Irving Singer's philosophy of love as
presentedin The Nature of Love and especially his hermeneuticdistinction
between "appraisal"and"bestowal,"a distinctionwhichmaps felicitously onto
the Platonicdisjunctionas sketchedabove. Singercriticizesthe Cartesiantheory
of love as excessively "appraisive,"that is, as relying too heavily on an objective standardas guarantorof the worth of beloved objects. I maintainon the
contrarythatthis interpretationdistortswhat Descartes'stexts tell us. By arguing thatthe will, with no necessaryinputfrom the appraisingintellect, is paramount in love judgments,I show that love for Descartesis largely an imaginative means of "bestowing"value which as such does not require either the
guidance or the corroborationof objective criteria.The bestowal theory warrants,rather,the free subjectivecreationof value. The distinctionwhich Singer
uses to criticize Descartes is thus turnedto Descartes'sfavor.
I. Before getting to that argument,however,we need to examine the place
which love as a specific passion has within the overall economy of the third
notionprimitive,4that is, the union of body and soul as distinctfrom the treatment of these elements as mutuallyseparate.Passionsare for Descartesa species of thought.In a general sense all "perceptions"are passions of the soul.
They representthe world to the will which then acts in some way on them
("action"is taken as the other species of thought).Now of these perceptions
generally considered, some are caused by the externalobjects of the senses5
and some by the naturalappetitesand affections of the body.6There are, however, those perceptions"whose effects we feel as being in the soul itself...."
These are strictly speaking the "passions"of the soul; and despite our not always being able to locate theirproximatecause,8they may be stimulatedby the
3 Descartes, The Passions

of the Soul, article 49 (Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Adam and
Tannery [rev. ed.; Paris, 1964-76], XI, 368; hereaftercited as AT); all references from The
Philosophical Writingsof Descartes, tr. J. Cottingham,R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch(Cambridge, 1985), I, II and III.
4 For Descartes's reference to the notions
primitives, see Letter to Elizabeth, 5.21.1643
(AT, III, 663).
5 Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, article 23 (AT, XI, 346).
6 Ibid., article 24 (AT, XI, 347).
7 Ibid., article 25
(AT, XI, 348).
8

Ibid.
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"fortuitousmovementof the spirits,"9by intellectualjudgments,or by external
objects which "excite"the nerves.10
With externalsensoryperceptions(like hearingor sight) the object-what
the perceptionis respondingto-or remote cause of the perceptionis located
outside us. Withthe internalsensations(like hunger)the objector remotecause
is inside the body (recallDescartes'sclaim in the Sixth Meditationthatthe heat
we feel on placing our handnear the fire cannotreside in the fire itself"). On
the one handthe locus andcause of both these classes of perceptionsis entirely
relatedto the body. On the otherhandthe "actions"of the soul (desireandwill)
have their locus and cause in the soul. But the passions have theirlocus inside
the soul, their remote cause or object most often (but by no means always)
outside the body (the charginglion which provokeseithercourageor fear) and
their proximatecause in the bodily movementsof the spirits.
A problemarises, however,regardingthe lack of precision in some of the
distinctionsDescartesis makinghere. Most glaringly,perhaps,it is difficultto
distinguish clearly the external sensory perceptions from the passions from
what has been said so far. Both respond principallyto external stimuli and
result in "ideas"in the soul. To clarify this ambiguity,it is helpful to examine
in turntwo aspects of Descartes'sdefinitionof passions of the soul, the first of
which describes a mechanicaldifference between passions and the rest of the
perceptionsand the second what can loosely be termed a phenomenological
difference.
Descartes maintainsthat the passions of the soul are "caused,maintained
and strengthenedby some particularmovement of the spirits."12
All passions
have their "last and most proximatecause" in this source.'3Descartestells us
that this is meant to distinguishpassions both from volitions-which as the
source of free activity are uncaused-and from other perceptions. Unfortunately,Descartesdoes not explainhere what the last and most proximatecause
of these otherperceptionscould be if it is not the spirits.StephenVoss has tried
to vindicate Descartes on this score by assertingthat the last and most proximate cause of sensory ideas is an activity of the nerves ratherthanthe spirits.'4
Presumably,this does not meanthatin the case of the passions, the nerveshave
no role whatsoeverto play. In the case of a situationleading to the passion of
fear, for example, the spirits will commonly do two things simultaneously:
they will stimulate the nerves which make the body turn and run from the
9Ibid.,article26 (AT,XI, 349).
10For a succinct
summaryof the Cartesianperceptiontypes and theircauses,cf. de
Sousa,TheRationalityof Emotion,29.
1Descartes,Meditations
on FirstPhilosophy(AT,VII, 83).
12
The
Passions
Descartes,
of theSoularticle27 (AT,XI, 349).
13
Ibid.,article29 (AT,XI, 350).
14
Descartes,ThePassionsof theSoul,tr.StephenH. Voss(Indianapolis,
1989),35, n. 30.
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threateningobject; and they will stimulatethe nerves of the heartto rarefythe
blood in such a way thatspiritswhich firstcause, then maintainand strengthen
the passion are continuallysent to the brain(this is why we "feel"the passion
as though it were in the heart).In both cases the nerves are necessary intermediaries.
However,with internalor external sensations, so goes the argument,the
nervousconnectionbetween the brainandthe variouspartsof the body is in the
end responsiblefor the generationof sensory ideas. If Voss is right, in distinguishing the passions and the externalsensationsin this way Descarteswould
be saying that, for example, the nerves do not require the assistance of the
spiritsin causing a sensationof (say) yellow. But this explanationcollapses on
closer inspection.In the Treatiseon Man Descartesmaintainsthatalthoughthe
nerves are sufficient for imprintingthe movementsof particularobjects on the
internalsurfaceof the brain,such movementsmust at thatpoint be transmitted
by the spirits in determinateways to the pineal gland.'5With all perceptions,
then, the spiritsplay a crucial role in the conversionof physical entities into
mentalones, and Descartesis clear thatthis functionfollows that of the nerves
in the causal sequence.Withoutthe spiritstherecould never be ideas, properly
speaking. Thus the nerves cannot be the "last and most proximatecause" of
sensory ideas, as Voss maintains.
For this reason we must look with suspicion on Descartes's attemptto
distinguish passions from other perceptions in a purely mechanical manner.
However, although the causal account of the distinction is not acceptable,
Descartes's mechanical distinctionmay still be tenable if we claim that with
the passions there is somehow simply "more"spirit-activitythan there is for
the otherperceptions.ThusVoss declaresthatthe spirits"haveonly a bit partto
play" in the formationof sensory ideas, whereastheirrole is paramountin the
formationof the passions. This quantitativedistinction is entirely too vague,
however, and is in any case not borne out by the texts Voss cites.16 We are
thereforeleft to conclude that Descartes offers us no rigorousmechanicaldistinction between the idea types in question.
But a more promisingavenue of inquiryremainsopen to us. Accordingto
Descartes,the passionsandthe sensationshave distinctphenomenological"references."We "refer"a passion directlyto the soul and not to the stimulus(thus
its locus is in the soul), whereas we "refer"an externalsensory perceptionto
the object stimulatingthe body and not to the mind where the idea is represented (thus its locus is in the externalworld).An internalsensationwe "refer"
to the body (thus its locus is the body).17 This "referencing"is not meant to
15

Descartes, Treatiseon Man (AT, XI, 142-44).
Voss, ThePassions of the Soul, 35, fn 30. Voss cites the Passions, articles 12, 23, and 24
(AT,XI, 337, 346 and 347).
17For the three separatetypes of reference,cf. Descartes, ThePassions of the Soul articles
23, 24, and 25 (AT,XI, 346-48).
16
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carryvery much scientific precision.We can, for example, confusedlyimagine
that a pain is "located"in the limb where we feel it, though strictlyspeakinga
pain is a thought.
But such confused thinkingis not illegitimateat a more fundamentallevel.
For referencing,on Descartes'sunderstandingof it, seems to describeour immediate or visceral relationto the perceptionin question, a relationbased on
the exigencies of experience.The importanceof our being awareof this relation is differentfor each of the perceptiontypes. In the case of externalsensation the importanceis epistemological-we are concernedto know the truthof
the corporealworld in which we move. In the case of internalsensation the
importanceis functional-we need to know when our body is in dangeror is
expressingbasic needs so thatwe may preserveit more efficiently.In the case
of the passions, the importanceis chiefly moral-we need to know how to
enhanceor perfectourselvesinsofaras we arerational,thoughembodied,creatures.
Moreover,since externalsensory perceptionsalmost always alertus to the
existence of realobjects in the world,they can be renderedless obscurethrough
the application of mathematicaland geometrical analysis. But the passions
"areso close and so internalto our soul" that, even when severely disordered,
they arenot susceptibleof correctionin the same way.18 In the end the information of the externalsenses, once linkedup clearlyand distinctlywith the matter
it represents,is our guide throughthe world of extension,whereasthe passions
neverlose theirrootednessin the mind as embodied,and neverthereforerelinquish their status as irreducibly"confused."So the analysis of "referencing"
not only helps us distinguishthe passions properfrom otherperceptions,it is
also Descartes's best way of elucidatingjust what the passions are for us. The
passions serve us, that is, solely to the extent that they cause us to want those
things which nature has deemed useful for us qua compound substances.'9
Thus the passions are concernedspecifically with the union of body and soul.
They are in fact the highest and most complex function of this third notion
primitive.

Now the passionof love has a distinguishedplace in this category.Descartes
defines love thus:"Loveis an emotion of the soul causedby a movementof the
spirits,which impels the soul to join itself willingly [de volonte]to objects that
appearto be agreeableto it."20Descartes says elsewherethatwhen we think of
somethingas beneficial for us, we are drawntowardsit and thus love it. Conversely, when we perceive something to be of potential harm to us, we are
impelled away from it, and consequentlyhate it.21This pictureis complicated
18Ibid., article 26

(AT,XI, 349).
19Ibid., article 52 (AT,XI, 372). Cf. also articles 40 and 74 (AT,XI, 359 and 383).
20
Ibid.,article 79 (AT,XI, 387).
21 Ibid., article 56
(AT,XI, 374).
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considerablyin thatDescartesfollows Augustinein dividinglove intotwo types,
the purely intellectualand the properlypassionate.Descartes explains that intellectual, or rational,love is based on an assessmentof the beloved's "objective" worth. The soul is drawnto join itself to such an object and to consider
itself as partof the whole which is thus engendered.Moreover,so pure is this
type of love, that it can exist in the soul even withoutthe body.22
The othertype of love, the passionate,is, as we have seen, the resultof the
union of body and soul. Althoughthis kind of love is unavoidableinsofaras we
Here the comare incarnate,it is in fact nothing but a "confusedthought."23
plexities associated with Descartes'sviews on the natureof love between persons begin to manifestthemselves. Forthe union of body and soul has resulted
in the emergence of ideas which are by definition not clear and distinct and
which may ipso facto involve us in "erroneous"relations with the external
world. When speaking of love, Descartesdoes not explicitly warnagainst"error,"but he does cautionus againstany love which rests on a "badfoundation,"
which is "unjustified"and which "joinsus to things which may be harmfulor
at least which deserve less considerationthanwe give them,"24
thus invokingat
least the possibility of checking our moraljudgmentsagainst the world.
So moralerrorwith respectto this passion involves us in actionswhich are
less than ideally groundedin a knowledge of the true worth of the beloved
object. Does Descartes then advise us to purgethe body-soul union of its confused and irrationalelements? If so, and given the ineluctableunion of body
and soul in this life, how is this to be accomplished?If not, then is Descartes
committedto the view thatconfused love, even love which involves us in error,
is morally permissible? It is in the context of these questions that I turn to
IrvingSinger'sdistinctionbetween "appraisal"and"bestowal"andhis critique
of Descartes.
II. If, as Cicero tells us, love is the attemptto form a friendshipinspiredby
beauty,then what of thatlove which sees and createsvalue in the non-beautiful
but neverthelessbeloved other?This is the dilemmawhich Irving Singer has,
throughouthis career,tried to come to grips with. Singer sees two strandsof
thoughtcoming out of the historyof philosophicalreflectionon love. The first,
what he identifies as "appraisal,"describes the broadly Platonic-Augustinian
approachto love. Here, the beloved is idealized as the bearerof a purposive,
transpersonalvalue like the Beautifulor the Good (the Ciceronianconception
just alludedto). What is importantaboutappraisivevaluing is that it is always
an evaluatingin accordancewith a publiclyrecognized,hence "objective"stanLetterto Chanut, 1.2.1647 (AT, IV, 600).
Ibid.
24 Descartes, The Passions
of the Soul article 142 (AT,XI, 435).

22

23
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dard.The task of evaluatingthus calls for the judgmentof relativelyimpartial
"experts"whose chief virtue is their knowledge of the moral facts. As the appraiserwould have it, when it comes to love the question of the Euthyphrois
easy to answer:we love solely because the object of our love is lovable.
The otherstrand,emerging chiefly fromthe Lutheran-Kantian
traditionof
thinking(but also extending,though less conspicuously,back to Plato), Singer
terms "bestowal."This refers to the spontaneouscreationof value in the beloved, the attemptto see the latter as inherentlyworthy even in spite of that
person'spossiblefailureto reflecta transpersonalideal.Thistype of love, Singer
writes, "supplementsthe searchfor humanvalue with a capacityfor bestowing
it gratuitously.To one who has succeeded in cultivatingthis attitude,anything
may be an object of love."25Unlike appraisivevaluing,therefore,which insists
that the lover must strictlyreflect an externallypresent and verifiablereality,
bestowed value cannotbe generatedsolely from outside. Singerthereforesees
bestowal as the seminalvalue in love betweenpersonsas such. The chief problem with the traditionof appraisalis thatit cannotarticulatethis human,all too
humantype of love. So the bestower's answerto Plato's questionis as unambiguous as was the appraiser's:something is lovable because we love it.
Descartes, accordingto Singer, sees love as strictlyappraisive:
In this world ... the soul is always joined to the body which generally
makes it necessary for rational love to be accompaniedby love as a
passion. For Descartes this only means that the body is disposed to
furtherthose interestsof the soul which constituteintellectuallove. At
no point does Descartes suggest that the impulses or instincts of the
body contributeto such love.26
Singer concludes from this that love for Descartes depends on knowledge of
the truth,27that the function of human beings as lovers is not conceptually
distinct from their function as knowers. As I stated at the outset, the sides of
this problemare too abstractlyseparatedin the Singer-Platoformulation,and
this is the sourceof Singer'soccasional misrepresentationsof variousphilosophers within the tradition.But the distinctionitself is useful and can in fact be
employed to enrichour understandingof Descartes'sposition. The immediate
problem to be addressed,therefore, is the claim that Descartes falls squarely
25

Irving Singer, The Nature of Love (Chicago, 1984), I, 14. We might well question
Singer's extreme formulationof the theory of bestowal here. Judgmentsabout moral objects
are not made in a vacuum,and it is thereforeunlikely that "anything"may be an object of love
for the bestower or that the latter'sbestowing activity is utterly "gratuitous."I owe this point
to an anonymousreaderat JHI.
26
Ibid., II, 259.
27
Ibid., 260.
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within the camp of appraisal-philosophers;and this, I suggest, is misguided.
Fromthe fact thatDescarteswants to subordinatebodily impulses to judgmental control(which he does), it does not necessarilyfollow that he subordinates
the passion of love utterlyto the demandsof epistemic or moral certainty.In
fact, it is precisely this inferenceI want to challenge. The fulcrumof my argument is a readingof Descarteson the freedomof the will.
III.Thereis an indisputablystrongcurrentof appraisalas a generallypositive value in Descartes'sthinking.To see this we need only look at his doctrine
of the will. In the FourthMeditation Descartes says that "(the will) consists
simply in the fact that when the intellect puts something forwardfor affirmation or denial ... our inclinationsare such thatwe do not feel we aredetermined
by any externalforce."28However,Descartesgoes on to say that,althoughnot
externallycompelled, we are not merely indifferentto our possible alternative
choices. Indeed, indifferenceis held to be the "lowest grade of freedom."29
Instead,we are most free when we act accordingto knowledge of the true and
the good. The intellect offers up the rightchoice afterclear and distinctreflection andthe will is then freely compelled to act on this choice, althoughwe are
in this case unconsciousof being moved by outsideforces. This is undoubtedly
the paradigmof rightactionfor Descartes:whereknowledge accordingto clear
and distinct ideasjustifies and counsels the final assent of the will. The will is
of course involved in the initialact of election, since it is responsiblefor evaluating objects in the first place, but in the end it is bound to assent to the determinationsof the appraisingintellect.
But should we think of the will as always and only guided by the light of
clear and distinct ideas? There is anotherstrainin Descartes's thinkingon the
will which emerges most conspicuously in a letter to Mesland of 1645 and
which challenges to some extent the view expressed in MeditationFour. In
clarifyingto Mesland what he meantby "indifference"in the Meditationsaccount of freedom, Descartes now asserts that he cannot find fault with those
who see indifference,when properlydefined,as a"positive faculty."According
to this understanding,not only is the will able to move in a directioncontraryto
that prescribedby evident reasons, but in doing so it may even be expressing
itself in an ideally free manner:"Forit is always open to us to hold back from
admittinga clearly perceived truth,provided we consider it a good thing to
demonstratethe freedom of our will by doing so."30Descartes maintainsfurtherthatfreedom may consist precisely "in a greateruse of the positive power
which we have of following the worse althoughwe see the better."3'
28

Descartes, Meditationson First Philosophy (AT,VII, 57).
Ibid.
30 Letter to
Mesland, 2.9.1645 (AT, IV, 173).
3' Ibid.
29
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Descartes'spurposein this letteris in fact to defendhis originalconception
of indifferenceas the lowest grade of freedom,that state in which we are simply not moved by any of our possible courses of action. In contrastto this
situation,being moved by objects which are contraryto reasonis seen as a free
use of a positive power.But by arguingthatthe will can be free both in refusing
to assent to a clearly perceived truth or in pursuinga good which is clearly
contraryto reason,Descartesseems to havecompromisedsignificantlythe stark
earlierview of the will as wholly subservientto reason.This single lettermay
not, of course,be sufficientto overturnthe powerfulmetaphysicof the Meditations, but it does indicatequite clearly a new directionin Descartes'sthinking
on this questionbetween 1641 and 1645.
AnthonyKennydisagreeswith this interpretationof the letterto Mesland,
assertingthatit is of a single piece with the doctrineof the Meditations.Kenny
argues that when Descartes claims it is always open to us to hold back from
pursuinga clearly known good he does not mean that we can do this while we
are in fact in apprehensionof the true and the good. At the moment of such
apprehensionourwill is compelled to assentto the perceptionof truthor goodness, an idea which is indeed in substantialaccord with the earlier view.32
KatherineShermannotes thatwhat Kennyoverlooks is the reasonthis is so. If
the will refused assent to a clear and distinct perceptionof the truthit would
involve itself in a contradictionsince Descartesdefines a clearanddistinctidea
as one which appearsonly to the attentivemind and the abilityto direct attention is precisely an act of will. The will cannot simultaneouslyhold attention
and withdrawit. Thus in saying that a person can refuse assent to a clearly
perceivedtruth,Descartesis only saying thatby doing so such a person would
The deeper
simply cease having a clear and distinctperceptionof that truth.33
for
Descartes's
account
is
to
the
how
problem
very possibility of the
explain
initial move from the apprehensionof an evident truthto the subsequentwithdrawalof attentionfrom it without underminingthe strongclaim that we must
assent to evident truths.
Kenny,claiming to echo Descartes, considers such a withdrawalof attention possible if we believe it to be a good thing to demonstrateour"perversity"
in doing so. Kenny adds correctly that this notion was there in Descartes's
thinking at least as early as the Meditations.34What Shermanherself overlooks, despite her focus on the Passions, is the questionas to what could pos32

Anthony Kenny, "Descarteson the Will" Cartesian Studies, ed. R. J. Butler (Oxford,
1972), 1-31.
33 Katherine
Sherman, "Descartes' Change of Mind," Philosophical Forum, 5 (1974),
557-71.
34
Kenny, "Descarteson the Will," 18. The relevantpassage from the Meditationsis (AT,
VII, 57). It should also be noted that Kenny disputes the 1645 dating of the letter to Mesland.
His case on this point is convincing, but so long as the letter falls between the Meditationsand
the Passions (which it certainly does) my point here carries.
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sibly provide the will with a compelling motive for rejecting a clearly and
distinctlyperceivedtruthin favorof one more obscurelyperceived(or of none
at all). I will returnto this point below.Althoughwe might objectto the moralistic tone of Kenny's formulation,such an act of will would indeed appear
strangeif not perverse.
Nevertheless, I think an answerto Kenny can be found in Descartes's last
significantarticulationof the problemof the will in The Passions of the Soul,
writtenin the winterof 1645-46 andpublishedin 1649, a yearbeforeDescartes's
death.Kenny's claim that Descartes'sthinkingon the problemof humanfreedom undergoesno real transformationin the laterworks is untenablein view of
the fact that he, Kenny,ignores this text altogether.35
In the Passions Descartes
makes no reference to the view of the will as the ineluctableexecutor of the
understanding'sclearlyanddistinctlyperceivedideas but insteadfurtherdevelops the position sketched in the letter to Mesland. So even though the latter
position is presentin the Meditations,it is significantlymutedthere;but this is
not the case in the Passions, where it becomes the dominantposition. It is
thereforeimpossible to deny for Descartes a strong shift of emphasis on this
point.
IV. In the Passions the will is seen as thatfacultywhich undertakesthe acts
of bestowing and of holding assent. Considerthe following statement,which
connects the problemof free will to that of the love passion:
[I]n using the word "willingly"[de volonte] I am not speakingof desire which is a completely separatepassion relating to the future. I
mean ratherthe assent by which we consider ourselves henceforthas
joined with what we love in such a mannerthatwe imagine a whole of
which we take ourselves to be only a part,and the thing loved to be the
other.36

Here Descartes wants us to think aboutthat assent by which we consider ourselves as committed, into the future,to a given course of action or judgment.
This describesthe ability to "takea stand"on something,to establisha connection with the object in questionwhich is solidified and preservedby the act of
assent itself and by the benevolentactivity which follows from it.
Now insofar as commitmententails sticking to a single judgment in the
face of possible alternatives,this view of the will seems to conflict-at least
35In a
paper devoted to showing that Spinoza's conception of Descartes's "absolutist"
doctrineof freedom is misguided, JohnCottinghamis guilty of the same oversight(despite the
promising title of his paper) ("The Intellect, the Will and the Passions: Spinoza's Critiqueof
Descartes,"Journal of the History of Philosophy, 26 [1988], 239-57).
36
Descartes, The Passions of the Soul article 80 (AT, XI, 387).
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potentially-with the dominant one in the pre-1645 sources. That is, on this
view it would be plausibleto supposethatthe will could establishandpreserve
its attachmentto somethingeven in the face of the intellect'sopposing counsel.
This may of course lead to "error"(nor is the reciprocityof the love-union
which Descartes stresses in the previous citation by itself sufficient to eliminate the possibility of moral error:both parties may be deluded). Indeed, as
Descartes makes clear in the Reply to the Fifth Objection,it is the most potent
source of error.The will extends furtherthan the intellect and so can attach
itself to objects of which the intellect might not approve.
But it might also be the case thatthe intellect may simply not be able fully
to "grasp"the object in question, "since in the case of any given object there
may be many things about it that we desire but very few things of which we
haveknowledge."37
Thenaturalresponseto this sortof impasse,the one Descartes
himself offers in the Meditations, is that we should simply suspend ourjudgment until such time as mattersbecome clearer to us. But in many practical
situations,this is neitherpossible nor desirable,as Descartesexplainsto Elizabeth:
[A]lthoughwe cannot have certaindemonstrationsof everything,we
nevertheless ought to take a position and embrace the opinions that
seem to us the most probablein regardto all the things in practice, so
that wheneverit is a question of acting we may never be irresolutewhich is what causes regretsand repentances.38
We have seen that in the Mesland letter Descartes goes furtherthan this in
allowing for adherenceto the merely probablenot only as a provisionalnecessity but even in the face of demonstrablycertaincontrarytruthclaims. In both
letterswe see thatDescartesthinksit imperativeto takea positionon important
matters,whether"good" reasons for doing so are evident or not and this emphasizes clearlythe role of the will as free causal agent.To this extent the will
leads the intellect and its activity, driven by desire, is thereforerequisite in
orderto pick out beloved objects in the first place. This ability freely to create
an attachmentto a beloved object and then to imaginativelyfortify one's attachmentto it is the sine qua non of bestowal as Singerunderstandsit.
My point is that the latter view of the will is especially pertinentto an
understandingof what it is to love someone and that"error"in this case is not
a compelling worryfor Descartes.Indeedit seems to me thatthis pictureof the
will as both (potential) discoverer of the beloved object and as that faculty
which allows for sustained commitmentto it can be seen respectively as the
37Descartes, Objectionsand Replies (AT,VII, 377).
38 Letter to
Elizabeth,9.15.1645 (AT, IV, 295).
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necessary and sufficientconditionsfor establishingthe real value of the object.
Much hangs, therefore, on which faculty-the will or the intellect-should
properly qualify as the sufficient condition in the latterformulation,since the
one we choose will be the ultimatearbiterin love judgments.
Descartes's"theoryof association"helps clarify andbuttressmy claim that
the will as free bestoweris supremein this respect.This theoryalso goes a long
way towardaccountingfor the "perversity"involvedin divertingattentionfrom
clearly and distinctlyperceivedtruthsby way of offering compelling psychological motivationfor such an act. In a letterto Chanut,Descartestells the story
of a little girl whom he, Descartes,had loved when he was a child. This girl had
a squint in her eyes which became for Descartes so attachedto the love he felt
for the girl that he could never thereaftersee a person with a squint without
feeling an upsurgeof love.39Descartesis tryingto addressChanut'squestionas
to how we can love someone before knowinghis or her real worth.Descartes's
answer is rooted in the speculativephysiological account he gives of the phenomenon of love in the Passions. (ThereDescartes describesthe movementof
blood and spiritswhich gives rise to love. Briefly, the thoughtof an object of
love forms an impressionin the brain which directs the animal spirits to the
muscles surroundingthe intestines and stomach.This then forces the alimentaryjuices to the heart,causing a greatswell of heat there.These spiritsare so
powerful that they cause the soul to dwell upon the object of love. Descartes
goes on to say thatthe first and formativeexperiencewe all had of love was in
the womb where we "fell in love" with the "fuel"which nourishedus. The soul
wanted to join itself to this fuel because of the heat which it maintainedin the
body.40)

In the same letterto Chanut,Descartesmaintainsthatnotwithstandingthe
blind physiological compulsion to love as a matterof mere associative habit,
we can control our love-judgments.He states flatly that a wise man will not
merely submit to these physiological promptingsbut will reflect carefully on
the real worth of the object in question. I do not want to gainsay the strongly
appraisivetone of such claims, but I would suggest that Descartes is on the
whole less worriedabout the sway of habitualassociations than he is about a
personbeing dominatedby the barrageof conflictingbodily impulses.Through
association, be it ever so imaginativelydistorted,a person at least establishes
authorityover the body. In the case of love this authorityis precisely what
allows for the constancyof the will's attachmentto a beloved object.
In speakingaboutDescartes'sprincipleof association,AnthonyLevi makes
the following claim:

39Letterto Chanut,6.6.1647
(AT,V, 50).
40Descartes, ThePassions of the Soul article 102 (AT, XI, 404).
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The ethical importanceof the principle of association lies in the fact
thatwe can both destroyand createassociationsbetween the passions
andthe movementsof the spiritspar habitudeandthereforeacquirean
empiretres absolu over the passions.41
Note that,accordingto Levi, theprimaryethical importof our faculty of association is not that it allows us to dispense with erroneousjudgments,but thatit
gives us control over the passions. The ability to manipulateassociations is
here seen as an end in itself as long as it allows us to establish control of the
body. With all this talk of dominatingthe body it might be objected that I am
just agreeingwith Singer;but this is not so, for Singer's essential claim is that
passionate love must, for Descartes, be subordinatedto rational love, which
always involves washing ourjudgmentsclean of all error.
The need to act determinately,however,is not synonymouswith the need
to act in truth,a point Descartes makes in addressingthe problem of conflict
among the passions:
it is true that very few people are so weak and irresolutethat they
choose only what theirpassion dictates. Most have some determinate
judgmentswhich they follow in regulatingsome of theiractions. Often
thesejudgmentsare false and based on passions by which the will has
previouslyallowed itself to be conqueredor led astray;butbecause the
will continuesto follow them when the passion which caused them is
absentthey may be consideredits properweapons and we may judge
souls to be strongeror weakeraccordingto theirabilityto follow these
judgments more or less closely and resist the presentpassions which
are opposed to them.42
Again, althoughDescartesgoes on in this articleto say thattruejudgmentsare
in general to be preferredto false ones since they will give us less cause to
repent,the focus is not on the need to supplantfalse judgmentswith trueones.
Not at all: here what is crucial in the face of conflicting passions is to stick to
one's chosen course, even if that course is "false."Precisely these judgments,
qua actions of the soul, express the "natural"freedomof the will, "which can
never be restrained"in making them.43This radicalizesDescartes's comment
to Elizabeth(quoted above) that in orderto avoid regretsand repentanceswe
need to act resolutely.Now the need for resolute or determinateaction is seen

41

AnthonyLevi, FrenchMoralists: TheTheoryof the Passions, 1585-1649 (Oxford, 1964),
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Descartes, The Passions of the Soul article 49 (AT, XI, 368), my emphasis.
Ibid., article 41 (AT, XI, 359).
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to extend even to those judgmentsand actions which are false. The searchfor
truthhere cedes pride of place to the imperativeto oppose presentpassions on
the strengthof learnedjudgments,whethertrue or false. The lattertask is only
said to require"sufficient ingenuity in training and guiding" the passions.44
Moreover,insofaras the holdingof assent is based on past relationsof will and
bodily impulse, the body is never fully transcendedin passionatelove.
So Descartes thinks that the will's "properweapons"are the individual's
"often false" determinatejudgments.But if these are themselves by definition
the productof the body-soul union, how can Singer legitimatelymaintainthat
for Descartesthe body's only functionin love is to contributewhateverit can to
the interestsof purely intellectuallove, a kind of love which can presumably
never be groundedin erroneousjudgments?45Determinatejudgments do not
move the cognitive process up to the rarefiedheights of the disembodiedunderstanding.The love passion, even when successfully "controlled"through
associative habit,remainsa necessarilyconcrete phenomenon.It is not a case
of the mind lording it over the body but of absent passions organizing and
quelling presentpassions accordingto the demandsof a relativelyfreely chosen value system.
As Singer sees it, love as bestowal cannot be delusionalor mistaken.It is
not a way of knowingthe worldbut rather"an imaginativemeans of bestowing
value which would not exist otherwise."46
The beloved is valued within a context which affirmshis or her importancein spite of the assessmentof appraisal.
This is not to say thatlove as bestowalexists solely and obstinatelyto spite and
oppose the calculationsof the appraisingmind; appraisalmight very well corroboratea set of values freely bestowed. But the intellect is not the final court
of appeal. Rememberingthat the will attacheditself spontaneouslyto the object in the first place, we can say thatthe economy of love as a passion-and
not simply as intellectualappreciation-is fully a determinationof the will in
its dual role as discoverer/holderof assent. The assent itself issues from the
needs of a unifiedpsycho-physicalsystem and this system is the expressionof
a createdindividualidentitywhose preservationand enhancementmustbe furtheredeven at the cost of overridingcompetingtruthclaims. In the languageof
active and passive powers fromPartI of the Passions, the will here is viewed as
an initiatingagent whose activity in setting up movementsin the pineal gland
does not, at any point in the cognitive process, requiredirectiveinputfromthe
understandingqua "patient."47

Ibid., article 50 (AT, XI, 369).
Singer, TheNature of Love, II, 259.
46
Ibid., I, 17.
47 Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, articles 1 and 2 (AT, XI, 328).
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Even the feeling of benevolence for the beloved which love induces is
largely a function of maintainingand enhancing the system. Once we have
joined ourselves to the beloved-an act which involves a good deal of blindness to competingobjects(including,possibly,"worthier"ones)-we will naturally be inclined to enrich imaginativelythe value of the beloved:
as soon as we have willinglyjoined ourselvesto some object,whatever
its naturemay be, we feel benevolenttowardsit-that is we also join
to it willingly the things we believe to be agreeableto it: this is one of
the principaleffects of love.48
When we love somethingwe want to join to it not those things which are good
for it, but those things we believe to be good for it. How is it possible thatthis
belief will not itself be coloured by the very love which provokes it, a love
which, I have argued,has little regardfor the demandsof moralcertainty?If it
is so effected, the value of the beloved has been takenout of the communityof
objective value appraisersand placed in the graspof the individualbestower.
Still, I resist the temptationto see Descartes'sphilosophy of love as a justificationof narcissismandto paintDescarteshimself as a kind ofproto-Proust.
As we have seen in the conception of the will in the FourthMeditation,the
imperativeto live in the light of clear and distinct ideas is never far from
Descartes's thinking. Furthermore,he makes referencein the Passions to the
fact that the love relationshipis a whole which has a value above the selfish
interestsof its members,49a point which should force on us the need to see the
relationship,in part at least, from the outside. But the overwhelmingfocus of
Descartes'sphilosophy of love is on the role of the free bestowerof value, and
this is why I argue that passionatelove, this-worldlylove, is somethingmore
than a mere confusion which as such must be clarifiedand disembodied.
Descarteshimself bothinvitesthis reductionandbalksat it, a conflictwhich
is encapsulatedfor example in the shortpassage he devotes to the passions in
The Principles of Philosophy. There he asserts that in the case of joy for example"theact of imaginationdoes not itself containthe feeling ofjoy" butthat
it does give rise to the movementof animal spiritswhich eventuallyresults in
the appropriatestimulationof the heartand the concomitantfeeling ofjoy. He
quickly adds that this whole process is precededand determinedby an act of
judgment which affords us a purely "intellectual"experience of the passion.
However,he almost immediatelyrevokes the latterrequirementwhen discussing the passion of sadnessas well as those of love, hate, fear,etc., assertingthat
48
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"the mind itself may perhapsnot know of any reason why it should be sad."
This suggests that the process driving the animal spirits to the heart can be
initiated in the absence of a commandfrom the intellect or at least in the absence of a clear and distinct command from it. Descartes goes on to say that
purelyimaginativelove andpurelyintellectuallove are"quitedifferentin kind."
Although they are often enough found together, he gives us no indicationin
Althis passage of which is worthiernor even if they admit of comparison.50
though Descartes eventuallyabandonedany concupiscent/benevolentdistinction,5'this passage indicatesthat even when he held something like it, he was
not unambiguouslyadvocatingthe subordinationof the passion to the appraising intellect.
It is clear thereforethat in the case of love the call to rid ourselvesof error
if
is, not silenced, at least suppressedfor Descartes.I do not claim thatthis is so
for all the passions (it is certainly not for hatred).There may be degrees of
allowableerrorfor the variouspassions dependingon theirfunctionalroles, the
way they preserveand/orperfectthe person. Thatquestionis beyondthe scope
of this paper;but we can safely say that although it is not always clear how
Descartes thinks the balance should be struck,he would evidently agree with
Donne thatlove is a "medicine"which "sometimeswould contemplate,sometimes do."
Universityof Toronto.
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